Election Integrity & Foreign Influence Database
The truth about elections, held to a single standard.
Elections documented, attacked, and defended — with proven falsification kept strictly apart from interference, propaganda, and mere anomaly. Every finding is tiered by the strength of its evidence.
- 45
- elections
- 20
- operations
- 210
- sources
Database last updated August 5, 2026
The database at a glance
Documented findings by category
Documented cases over time
2019–2027 · 52 of 65
Five categories, never conflated
The difference between these is the whole point. An attacked election is not the same as a falsified one.
The recorded numbers do not reflect the votes cast.
Process violationsUnequal media access, repression, illegal financing, vote buying, misuse of state resources.
Foreign interferenceCyberattacks, hack-and-leak, covert foreign financing, impersonation of media or institutions by a foreign state or proxy.
Information operationsTroll farms, fake local-media networks, covert political ads, coordinated inauthentic amplification — foreign or domestic.
Statistical anomaliesPatterns in the data worth examining — explicitly not proof of fraud.
A finding sits in exactly one category. Colors and icons carry the same meaning everywhere on the site.
From the case files
What was proven — and what was not
The clearest test of a trustworthy record is whether it can hold both statements at once.
France 2017 Presidential Election
What is established
- Information operationsConfirmed
A hack-and-leak dump of roughly nine gigabytes of stolen En Marche emails appeared online on 5 May 2017, hours before the mandatory pre-vote media blackout. Forged documents were mixed in with genuine ones, and the material was amplified as #MacronLeaks to about half a million tweets within 24 hours by bot networks and US alt-right accounts.
- Foreign interferenceCorroborated
The campaign was targeted by spear-phishing in the weeks before the leak. Trend Micro linked the phishing infrastructure to APT28 (GRU) in April 2017, and in October 2020 the United States indicted six officers of GRU Unit 74455 (Sandworm) for the 2017 hack-and-leak against En Marche.
What is not established
- Result falsificationDebunked
There is no evidence the operation changed the result. Macron won decisively (66.1% to 33.9%) on hand-counted paper ballots; the leak's timing against the media blackout, the electoral commission's warning not to republish it, and the obvious forgeries in the dump all limited its effect.
- Foreign interferenceContested
Attribution was not established in real time. France's cyber-defence agency ANSSI found no APT28 fingerprints in the leak, and its director said the attack was 'so generic and simple that it could have been practically anyone.' A formal state attribution came later and from abroad — the 2020 US indictment — not from France in 2017.
Sources:1
Method
Why you can trust this
No source, no claim. The same taxonomy and evidence bar applies to every country, party, and government — including Western democracies.
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How votes are counted and verified, why interference is not the same as fraud, and how to check a viral claim yourself.
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Recently added and revised
- SourceIllegal Doppelganger operation: targeting the Polish elections
- SourceConstitutional Court of Romania, Decision No. 32/2024 (annulment)
- SourceJustice Department disrupts covert Russian government-sponsored foreign malign influence operation
- SourceSix Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace
- SourceEuropean Union Election Observation Mission Ecuador 2025 final report