Drag to pan · scroll to zoom · click a marker

Election Integrity & Foreign Influence Database

The truth about elections, held to a single standard.

Elections documented, attacked, and defended — with proven falsification kept strictly apart from interference, propaganda, and mere anomaly. Every finding is tiered by the strength of its evidence.

Explore elections How we verify

45: elections
20: operations
210: sources

Database last updated August 5, 2026

Election spotlight

2022

HungaryParliamentaryHeld

Hungary 2022 Parliamentary Election

Viktor Orbán's Fidesz–KDNP won a fourth consecutive two-thirds majority (135 of 199 seats) with 54.13% of the national list vote on 3 April 2022, defeating the six-party United for Hungary joint list (34.44%, 57 seats); Our Homeland entered with 6 seats and the German minority took 1. ODIHR assessed election day as well-administered but found the campaign lacked a level playing field — blurred lines between state and ruling-party messaging, biased media, and weak campaign-finance oversight. A government-called referendum held the same day failed validity thresholds.

Process violations

1 established · 1 not established

See what the evidence shows

Next up

See the full calendar

Five categories, never conflated

The difference between these is the whole point. An attacked election is not the same as a falsified one.

Result falsification

The recorded numbers do not reflect the votes cast.

Process violations

Unequal media access, repression, illegal financing, vote buying, misuse of state resources.

Foreign interference

Cyberattacks, hack-and-leak, covert foreign financing, impersonation of media or institutions by a foreign state or proxy.

Information operations

Troll farms, fake local-media networks, covert political ads, coordinated inauthentic amplification — foreign or domestic.

Statistical anomalies

Patterns in the data worth examining — explicitly not proof of fraud.

A finding sits in exactly one category. Colors and icons carry the same meaning everywhere on the site.

From the case files

What was proven — and what was not

The clearest test of a trustworthy record is whether it can hold both statements at once.

Ukraine 2014 Early Presidential Election

What is established

Process violationsConfirmed
The Central Election Commission's results system was compromised in the days before the vote, disabling core network nodes and leaving the software that displays real-time vote counts inoperative for close to twenty hours.
More detail
The head of Ukraine's national computer emergency response team at the time records the compromise on 21 May, attributed to the group CyberBerkut. ODIHR separately recorded that the CEC's informatics system Vybory suffered a cyber-attack on 22 May and that on election night the network linking district commissions to the system was not working, contributing to delays in tabulation.
Sources:1 2
Information operationsConfirmed
Twelve minutes before polls closed, the attackers posted an image on the CEC website falsely presenting Dmytro Yarosh as the winner with 37 per cent, and Russian Channel One broadcast that fabricated page as the official result.
More detail
The image went up at 19:48 EET on 25 May and was shown on Russian television the same evening, with the fabricated figures giving Yarosh 37 per cent against Petro Poroshenko's 29 per cent. Ukrainian officials said the numbers had been prepared in advance and stored on Russian internet resources. Yarosh's actual result was 0.71 per cent; Poroshenko won outright with 54.7 per cent.
Sources:1 2

What is not established

Result falsificationDebunked
That the count or the declared result was altered — did not happen. The fabricated page never touched a vote: ballots are paper, counted by hand at the precinct and physically delivered for aggregation, and the published official result matched the count. CERT-UA's own assessment is that the attack could in no way have determined the outcome.
Sources:1 2
Foreign interferenceContested
That a named foreign state directed the operation — not formally established. No court ruling or government attribution in this record names a sponsor; the state-sponsorship claim rests on the responders' technical inference and on the immediate amplification of the fabricated page by Russian state television.
Sources:1 2

Open the full case

Method

Why you can trust this

No source, no claim. The same taxonomy and evidence bar applies to every country, party, and government — including Western democracies.

Read the methodology

Academy

Learn how elections actually work

How votes are counted and verified, why interference is not the same as fraud, and how to check a viral claim yourself.

Enter the Academy

Updates

Recently added and revised

All updates