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Election Integrity Database

The truth about elections, held to a single standard.

Elections documented, attacked, and defended — with proven falsification kept strictly apart from interference, propaganda, and mere anomaly. Every finding is tiered by the strength of its evidence.

64
elections
20
operations
555
sources

Database last updated September 24, 2026

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The database at a glance

Documented findings by category

Result falsification18
Process violations126
Foreign interference23
Information operations43
Statistical anomalies11

Documented cases over time

2019202020212022202320242025202620272019 · Malawi 2019–2020 Presidential Election and Fresh Election2019 · Canada 2019 General Election2019 · Bolivia 2019 General Election2019 · Star Blizzard UK 2019 trade-document hack-and-leak2019 · United Kingdom 2019 General Election2020 · Belarus 2020 Presidential Election2020 · Iran 2020 Voter-Threat and Disinformation Campaign2020 · United States 2020 Presidential Election2021 · Zambia 2021 General Election2021 · PRC-linked WeChat narratives in Canada's 2021 election2021 · Germany 2021 Federal Election2021 · Canada 2021 General Election2021 · Morocco 2021 Parliamentary Election2021 · Cabo Verde 2021 Presidential Election2021 · Nicaragua 2021 General Election2021 · The Gambia 2021 Presidential Election2022 · Hungary 2022 Parliamentary Election2022 · Philippines 2022 Presidential Election2022 · Doppelganger / RRN2022 · Sweden 2022 Parliamentary Election2022 · Bosnia and Herzegovina 2022 General Election2022 · Brazil 2022 Presidential Election2022 · Latvia 2022 Parliamentary Election2022 · Israel 2022 Knesset Election2022 · Fiji 2022 General Election2023 · DRAGONBRIDGE / Spamouflage Taiwan 2024 Campaign2023 · Iran CDPC U.S. 2024 Influence Planning2023 · Nigeria 2023 Presidential Election2023 · Türkiye 2023 Presidential Election2023 · Guatemala 2023 General Election2023 · Storm-15162023 · Slovakia 2023 Parliamentary Election2023 · Storm-1679 / Matryoshka2023 · Argentina 2023 General Election2023 · Poland 2023 Parliamentary Elections2023 · New Zealand 2023 General Election2023 · Serbia 2023 Early Parliamentary Election2024 · Taiwan 2024 Presidential Election2024 · CGE U.S. 2024 AI Disinformation Operation2024 · Indonesia 2024 Presidential Election2024 · Pakistan 2024 General Election2024 · Senegal 2024 Presidential Election2024 · Russia 2024 Presidential Election2024 · India 2024 Lok Sabha Election2024 · South Africa 2024 General Election2024 · Iran 2024 U.S. Hack-and-Leak Campaign2024 · Zero Zeno India 2024 activity2024 · France 2024 Snap Legislative Election2024 · France 2024 European Parliament Election2024 · Mexico 2024 General Election2024 · Venezuela 2024 Presidential Election2024 · Șor Network Moldova Election Operations, 2024–20252024 · Bulgaria 2024 October Parliamentary Election2024 · Georgia 2024 Parliamentary Elections2024 · Moldova 2024 Presidential Election & EU Referendum2024 · Mozambique 2024 General Election2024 · Romania 2024 Presidential Election (annulled)2024 · United States 2024 Presidential Election2024 · Romania TikTok Amplification Operation, 20242025 · Germany 2025 Federal Election2025 · Ecuador 2025 Presidential Election2025 · Poland 2025 Presidential Election2025 · Romania 2025 Repeat Presidential Election2025 · South Korea 2025 Presidential Election2025 · Moldova 2025 Parliamentary Election2026 · Rokh Solis2026 · France 2026 Municipal Elections2026 · Zambia 2026 General Election2026 · Russia 2026 State Duma Election2026 · Sweden 2026 Parliamentary Election

2019–2027 · 70 of 84

20042027
70/84

From the case files

What was proven — and what was not

The clearest test of a trustworthy record is whether it can hold both statements at once.

France 2024 Snap Legislative Election

What is established

  • Process violationsConfirmed

    Reviewing 85 challenges, the Constitutional Council annulled the election in two constituencies and later declared three elected deputies ineligible for campaign-finance breaches, removing them from office.

    More detail

    On 13 February 2025 it annulled the election in the 2nd constituency of Jura because the winner's second-round opponent, under reinforced guardianship, had been ineligible and his participation decisively affected the distribution of votes. On 7 March 2025 it annulled the election in the 5th constituency of Saône-et-Loire: counting errors at three polling stations, where tables found more ballots than envelopes, led it to deduct five votes from every candidate, which left a candidate who had cleared the 12.5 per cent threshold for the second round by four votes below it. On 11 July 2025 it declared Jean Laussucq (Paris, 2nd constituency), Stéphane Vojetta (5th constituency for French residents abroad) and Brigitte Barèges (Tarn-et-Garonne, 1st constituency) ineligible for one year over expenses paid outside the rules or an in-kind municipal contribution, so that by-elections were required. Each decision concerned a single constituency; none bore on the national result.

    Sources:1234
  • Information operationsConfirmed

    VIGINUM attributed with high confidence to the Russian Storm-1516 set a fake 'Ensemble' coalition website that told voters the coalition would pay them 100 euros for their vote.

    More detail

    VIGINUM assesses with a high level of confidence that operators of the CopyCop network, which it describes as directly involved in Storm-1516 operations, registered the domain ensemble-24.fr on 19 June 2024, typosquatting the coalition's official site ensemble-2024.fr and copying its graphic identity. The fake site claimed the coalition was offering voters a 'Macron bonus' of 100 euros in exchange for their vote and asked them to send their national insurance number to an address matching the party's. VIGINUM dates the operation to 26 June 2024 and counts it among at least 20 Storm-1516 operations aimed at elections in Europe and the United States; it does not measure the site's reach or any effect on votes.

    Sources:1

What is not established

  • Process violationsDebunked

    Challenges claiming that the compressed timetable violated the freedom or integrity of the election were rejected by the Constitutional Council, which held that the 30 June first round complied with Article 12's 20-to-40-day window.

    Sources:12
  • Statistical anomaliesDebunked

    A mismatch between nationwide second-round vote shares and total seats is not evidence of altered counts. Candidates did not contest every constituency in round two, and seats were awarded through 577 separate races.

    Sources:1
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Method

Why you can trust this

No source, no claim. The same taxonomy and evidence bar applies to every country, party, and government — including Western democracies.

Read the methodology

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