Election Integrity & Foreign Influence Database
The truth about elections, held to a single standard.
Elections documented, attacked, and defended — with proven falsification kept strictly apart from interference, propaganda, and mere anomaly. Every finding is tiered by the strength of its evidence.
- 45
- elections
- 20
- operations
- 210
- sources
Database last updated August 5, 2026
The database at a glance
Documented findings by category
Documented cases over time
2019–2027 · 52 of 65
Five categories, never conflated
The difference between these is the whole point. An attacked election is not the same as a falsified one.
The recorded numbers do not reflect the votes cast.
Process violationsUnequal media access, repression, illegal financing, vote buying, misuse of state resources.
Foreign interferenceCyberattacks, hack-and-leak, covert foreign financing, impersonation of media or institutions by a foreign state or proxy.
Information operationsTroll farms, fake local-media networks, covert political ads, coordinated inauthentic amplification — foreign or domestic.
Statistical anomaliesPatterns in the data worth examining — explicitly not proof of fraud.
A finding sits in exactly one category. Colors and icons carry the same meaning everywhere on the site.
From the case files
What was proven — and what was not
The clearest test of a trustworthy record is whether it can hold both statements at once.
Poland 2025 Presidential Election
What is established
- Information operationsConfirmed
Under the government’s “Parasol Wyborczy” (Election Umbrella) programme, NASK and partners handled roughly 27,500 potential incidents, reported over 16,000 accounts linked to influence operations to platforms, and identified 176 candidate-impersonation incidents (169 blocked).
Sources:1 - Information operationsCorroborated
The Russia-linked Doppelganger operation targeted the campaign on X, mimicking the branding of legitimate Polish outlets to push anti-EU and anti-Ukraine narratives; researchers attributed it to Russia’s EU-sanctioned Social Design Agency.
Sources:1
What is not established
- Result falsificationDebunked
That the count was falsified or the outcome would change — not established. The only body to adjudicate found the confirmed irregularities immaterial to the result.
- Process violationsContested
The legitimacy of the Supreme Court chamber that validated the election is itself contested — rejected by the current government, European courts and many Supreme Court judges. The dispute concerns the validating body’s status, not evidence that the tally was wrong.
Sources:1
Method
Why you can trust this
No source, no claim. The same taxonomy and evidence bar applies to every country, party, and government — including Western democracies.
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How votes are counted and verified, why interference is not the same as fraud, and how to check a viral claim yourself.
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Recently added and revised
- SourceIllegal Doppelganger operation: targeting the Polish elections
- SourceConstitutional Court of Romania, Decision No. 32/2024 (annulment)
- SourceJustice Department disrupts covert Russian government-sponsored foreign malign influence operation
- SourceSix Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace
- SourceEuropean Union Election Observation Mission Ecuador 2025 final report