Skip to content

Election Integrity & Foreign Influence Database

The truth about elections, held to a single standard.

Elections documented, attacked, and defended — with proven falsification kept strictly apart from interference, propaganda, and mere anomaly. Every finding is tiered by the strength of its evidence.

45
elections
20
operations
210
sources

Database last updated August 18, 2026

The database at a glance

45
Elections documented
20
Influence operations
3
Narratives tracked
210
Archived sources
+4 this month

Documented findings by category

Result falsification9
Process violations40
Foreign interference20
Information operations26
Statistical anomalies5

Documented cases over time

2019202020212022202320242025202620272019 · Malawi 2019–2020 Presidential Election and Fresh Election2019 · Canada 2019 General Election2019 · Star Blizzard UK 2019 trade-document hack-and-leak2019 · United Kingdom 2019 General Election2020 · Belarus 2020 Presidential Election2020 · Iran 2020 Voter-Threat and Disinformation Campaign2020 · United States 2020 Presidential Election2021 · Zambia 2021 General Election2021 · PRC-linked WeChat narratives in Canada's 2021 election2021 · Germany 2021 Federal Election2021 · Canada 2021 General Election2021 · Morocco 2021 Parliamentary Election2021 · Cabo Verde 2021 Presidential Election2021 · The Gambia 2021 Presidential Election2022 · Hungary 2022 Parliamentary Election2022 · Doppelganger / RRN2022 · Sweden 2022 Parliamentary Election2022 · Brazil 2022 Presidential Election2022 · Israel 2022 Knesset Election2022 · Fiji 2022 General Election2023 · DRAGONBRIDGE / Spamouflage Taiwan 2024 Campaign2023 · Iran CDPC U.S. 2024 Influence Planning2023 · Nigeria 2023 Presidential Election2023 · Türkiye 2023 Presidential Election2023 · Storm-15162023 · Slovakia 2023 Parliamentary Election2023 · Storm-1679 / Matryoshka2023 · Poland 2023 Parliamentary Elections2023 · Serbia 2023 Early Parliamentary Election2024 · Taiwan 2024 Presidential Election2024 · CGE U.S. 2024 AI Disinformation Operation2024 · Russia 2024 Presidential Election2024 · India 2024 Lok Sabha Election2024 · Iran 2024 U.S. Hack-and-Leak Campaign2024 · Zero Zeno India 2024 activity2024 · France 2024 Snap Legislative Election2024 · France 2024 European Parliament Election2024 · Mexico 2024 General Election2024 · Venezuela 2024 Presidential Election2024 · Șor Network Moldova Election Operations, 2024–20252024 · Georgia 2024 Parliamentary Elections2024 · Moldova 2024 Presidential Election & EU Referendum2024 · Romania 2024 Presidential Election (annulled)2024 · United States 2024 Presidential Election2024 · Romania TikTok Amplification Operation, 20242025 · Germany 2025 Federal Election2025 · Ecuador 2025 Presidential Election2025 · Poland 2025 Presidential Election2025 · Romania 2025 Repeat Presidential Election2025 · Moldova 2025 Parliamentary Election2026 · Rokh Solis2026 · France 2026 Municipal Elections

2019–2027 · 52 of 65

20042027
52/65

From the case files

What was proven — and what was not

The clearest test of a trustworthy record is whether it can hold both statements at once.

Ecuador 2025 Presidential Election

What is established

  • Process violationsCorroborated

    Incumbency and government communication created an uneven campaign environment.

    More detail

    The EU mission identified advantages linked to the sitting president's office, including campaign-period presidential activity and government advertising. Its priority recommendations called for limiting government and presidential activity to current affairs or emergencies and strengthening controls on institutional communication. These imbalances matter even though observers found election-day voting and counting transparent.

    Sources:1
  • Information operationsCorroborated

    Fraud narratives circulated before and after the runoff without objective support in the records observers reviewed.

    More detail

    The losing ticket alleged fraud on election night, and fraud narratives circulated through the campaign. EU and OAS observers tested the allegations against direct observation, publication systems and tally-sheet images and did not find supporting evidence.

    Sources:12

What is not established

  • Result falsificationDebunked

    Observer review found no evidence that questioned tally sheets were changed in the computerized result.

    More detail

    The OAS mission randomly selected questioned tally-sheet images and compared them with the CNE results system without finding irregularities or inconsistencies. The EU mission likewise found no objective elements supporting fraud accusations after observing both rounds and the post-election period.

    Sources:12
  • Statistical anomaliesDebunked

    A small number of ink-transfer cases did not amount to systematic ballot invalidation.

    More detail

    The OAS observed isolated cases where ink marked a folded ballot, but nearly all were resolved at the polling board in front of both tickets' representatives. It found very few affected ballots, no systematic intent and no scale capable of affecting the result.

    Sources:1
Open the full case

Method

Why you can trust this

No source, no claim. The same taxonomy and evidence bar applies to every country, party, and government — including Western democracies.

Read the methodology

Academy

Learn how elections actually work

How votes are counted and verified, why interference is not the same as fraud, and how to check a viral claim yourself.

Enter the Academy